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Can the CCCTB Alleviate Tax Discrimination  
against Loss-making European Multinational Groups? 
 
Regina Ortmann* and Caren Sureth** 
Abstract 
In March 2011, the European Commission submitted a proposal for a Council Directive on an 
optional common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB). If this proposed CCCTB system 
comes into force, taxes calculated under the currently existing system of separate accounting might 
be replaced by a system of group consolidation and formulary apportionment. Then, multinational 
groups (MNGs) would face the decision as to whether to opt for the CCCTB system. Prior research 
focuses mainly on the differences in economic behaviour under both systems in general. By con-
trast, we study the conditions under which one or the other tax system is preferable from the per-
spective of an MNG, with a particular focus on loss-offsets. We identify four effects that determine 
the decision of an MNG: the tax-utilization of losses, the allocation of the tax base, the dividend 
and intragroup interest taxation. We find mixed results, e.g., that the CCCTB system proves ad-
vantageous for increasing loss/profit streams (e.g. from start-ups or R&D projects) of the individual 
group entities, whereas the system of separate accounting is beneficial for decreasing profit/loss 
streams (e.g. caused by a decrease in return from a mature product). The results of our analysis are 
helpful for MNGs facing the decision as to whether to opt for the CCCTB system and can also 
support legislators and politicians in the EU but also in other regions in their tax reform discussions. 
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1 Introduction 
Cross-border loss-offset has become an important topic for multinational groups (MNGs) in the Euro-
pean Union (EU) in recent years. In the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis, in many EU 
countries the amount of incurred losses and loss carry-forwards has increased significantly. Further-
more, in particular, start-ups and R&D investment as examples for innovative activities, which are cru-
cial for MNGs’ future performance, often are characterized by initial losses. 
However, under the system of separate accounting (SA) currently applied in Europe, MNGs often are 
unable to use their losses to decrease their tax payments. The majority of EU countries does not allow 
the cross-border offsetting of group losses.1 Thus, losses incurred by a subsidiary in one country may 
not be offset against taxable profits of a parent company domiciled in another country (see Andersson 
2007, p. 85). Limited cross-border loss-offsets ultimately result in an over-taxation of MNGs (see Eu-
ropean Commission 2011, p. 4; Andersson 2007, p. 98). The European Commission (2006) states that 
“the limited availability of cross-border loss relief is one of the most significant obstacles to cross-border 
business activity”. Thus, the Commission aims to introduce a common tax base to address those provi-
sions in the tax system that limit the growth of companies seeking to benefit from the European single 
market (see European Commission 2010, p. 18). In March 2011, the European Commission (2011) sub-
mitted a proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). 
In April 2012, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the CCCTB Directive and proposed 
certain amendments to the Commission’s initial version.2 The debate continues on how to refine the 
CCCTB system. 
The CCCTB Directive is a comprehensive set of rules. If this directive comes into force, MNGs operat-
ing within the EU would be able to opt for the CCCTB system and calculate their taxable profits on a 
consolidated basis. However, even if the proposed CCCTB system were to reduce the over-taxation 
arising from the widespread use of the system of SA in the EU, it would not necessarily always be 
advantageous for a European MNG to opt for it. To make the right choice, MNGs would have to weigh 
the advantages and disadvantages of the CCCTB system against those of the respective national laws 
which govern companies that use SA. Assuming the CCCTB system as outlined in the Council Di-
rective, we identify factors that determine whether a European temporarily loss-making MNG should 
opt for the CCCTB system.  
The differences in loss-offset regulations under the system of SA and under the CCCTB system consti-
tute the trade-offs that are crucial for the advantageousness of either system. Whereas under the CCCTB 
system MNGs can make use of the cross-border loss-offset, it does not allow parent companies and 
                                                 
1  Only Denmark, Austria and Italy are exceptions. Under certain conditions they allow consolidated taxation of 
MNGs (see Schuchter and Kras (2014), p. 13; Ambagtsheer-Pakarinen (2014), p. 13; Gallo (2014), p. 14). 
2  As it is uncertain if and to what extent these proposed amendments will be considered in the course of a potential 
CCCTB implementation, we disregard them in this analysis. 
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subsidiaries carrying losses backward. By contrast, some European countries do allow loss carry-backs 
under their domestic laws. Nevertheless, the vast majority has not implemented cross-border loss-offset 
provisions. Furthermore, losses can be carried forward indefinitely under the CCCTB system, whereas 
in many EU countries loss carry-forwards are either limited in amount or time under SA. Beside the 
loss-offset provisions, tax base effects matter to a considerable degree as well. Against this rather com-
plex background it is important to investigate under which conditions which of these two systems causes 
a lower tax burden for MNGs than the other. 
Even though the cross-border loss-offset is one of the main pillars of the proposed CCCTB system, there 
is little research that compares the proposed CCCTB system and the current system of SA with regard 
to loss-offset possibilities. The few existing studies presume simplified, stylized national loss-offset 
provisions and account – if at all – for a few representative profit/loss scenarios. We expand these studies 
by accounting for national tax characteristics in detail and by investigating implications about the tax 
systems in dependence on a vast range of different profit/loss patterns.  
In a first step, as an example and to model common loss-offset rules, we examine an MNG domiciled 
in both France and Germany. We select these countries as representative examples for two reasons. First, 
Germany and France are the biggest economies in the EU (see The World Bank 2012) and thus of major 
importance. Second, Germany and France are strongly pushing for a coordinated European tax base and 
have already attempted to establish a mutual CCCTB that is independent of the other EU Member States 
(see German Federal Ministry of Finance 2012). Thus, the implementation of a CCCTB between those 
two countries is more likely than between any other EU countries. Since the loss-offset rules in France 
and Germany are highly specific we extent in a next step the scope of our analysis for other EU Member 
States. We generalize our model for different types of loss-offset provisions that are representative for 
the variety of provisions in place in the EU Member States. 
We model different combinations of profit/loss streams for a European MNG. The time patterns and 
magnitudes of the profits and losses are key determinants of the advantageous nature of one tax system 
over the other. The Franco-German model enables us to identify four effects that determine whether one 
or the other tax system is advantageous: the tax utilization of losses during the considered time frame, 
the different allocation of the tax base between France and Germany under each tax system and the 
taxation of intragroup interest and dividends. The analysis reveals that for most combinations of 
profit/loss streams for the Franco-German MNG, the CCCTB system is advantageous. However, the 
system of SA tends to be advantageous for investments generating time sequences of profits and losses 
that allow for the utilization of loss carry-backs. Counter-intuitively – and in contrast to previous studies, 
the CCCTB system is no longer unconditionally preferable if a cross-border loss-offset is available. 
Depending on the timing and magnitude of the entities’ profits and losses, the benefit from loss carry-
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backs under SA may exceed the advantage of the cross-border loss-offset under the CCCTB. The gen-
eralization of the model points out that in some EU countries that do not tax intragroup dividends and 
allow an unrestricted loss carry-forward the advantageousness of each system is determined by the al-
location of the tax base between EU countries alone. 
This article first provides an overview over the most relevant literature (Section 2), followed by an 
explanation of the legal basis of both tax systems (Section 3). In Section 4, the Franco-German model 
is introduced. The numerical analysis in Section 5 compares the after-tax outcome for the MNG, given 
different combinations of profit/loss streams of both group companies between both tax systems. Fur-
thermore, the specific Franco-German model is generalized to account also for other EU Member States. 
Finally, the main results of the analysis are summarized (Section 6). 
2 Prior Literature 
Two main streams of research are relevant to our research question. First, prior research examines the 
impact of loss treatment on investment in either an interstate or cross-border loss-offset situation. Auer-
bach (1986), Auerbach and Poterba (1987) and Majd and Myers (1987) find that the absence of loss-
offset possibilities discourages investment. Against this background, we expect that the design of loss-
offset rules also matters for the advantageousness of the CCCTB system and of the system of SA. Both 
tax systems allow the offsetting of losses, but differ in the design of the rules. Hence, we investigate 
how specific loss-offset provisions impact the relative attractiveness of the underlying tax systems. 
In prior research Barlev and Levy (1975) distinguish between loss carry-forwards and carry-backs, 
which are both applied under the system of SA in our extended model. In contrast, Donnely and Young 
(2002) focus on the loss-offset by means of group consolidation as applied under the CCCTB system. 
By determining the expected value of tax savings in different countries, Barlev and Levy (1975) find 
that in addition to loss carry-forwards, carry-back provisions are highly valuable and can improve the 
economic conditions for companies greatly. Donnely and Young (2002) conclude that under group tax-
ation regimes, the tax value of losses is highest. In a study about the Austrian cross-border group taxation 
regime, Pummerer and Steckel (2005) investigate possible implications of such a system under uncer-
tainty. They conclude that positive effects of the cross-border group taxation regime might be balanced 
out by disadvantages due to limitations in loss carry-forwards. In our analysis we succeed to further 
disentangle the effects from cross-border loss-offset and limitations in loss carry-forwards. In line with 
Donnely and Young (2002), Pummerer and Steckel (2005) and Barlev and Levy (1975), we expect that 
the cross-border loss-offset and the unlimited loss carry-forward under the CCCTB system and the loss 
carry-back provisions under the system of SA increase the relative attractiveness of each tax system. 
However, from their studies we cannot deduce the specific conditions under which one tax system is 
preferable.  
Based on data of German multinationals, Dreßler and Overesch (2013) analyse empirically how the 
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treatment of potential losses impacts multinational investment. In contrast to the analytical study of 
Barlev and Levy (1975), Dreßler and Overesch (2013) find no statistically significant effects of loss 
carry-back and, in contrast to Donnely and Young (2002), they find only mixed evidence that group 
loss-offset provisions foster investment. However, their results suggest that limiting the time frame for 
loss carry-forwards has detrimental investment effects for companies with a high probability of incurring 
losses. The limitation of loss carry-forwards, e.g., as applied under SA by the minimum taxation in 
France and Germany, reduces the attractiveness of SA. While previous studies often disregard detailed 
loss-offset rules, we integrate them into our model and find loss carry-forward and carry-back, as well 
as cross-border loss-offsets are significant features of a tax system and a driver as regards whether an 
MNG is likely to opt for the CCCTB system. We expand the previous studies also by taking account of 
different profit/loss time patterns. Thus, we are able to draw conclusions about the effects of differently 
designed loss-offset regimes, depending on different profit/loss-scenarios. 
The second literature stream deals with the shift from SA to consolidation and formulary apportionment. 
As we do not focus on profit-shifting activities under the two systems (like, e.g., Klassen and Shackel-
ford 1998; Goolsbee and Maydew 2000; Mintz and Smart 2004), we refer only to those studies that 
investigate at least to some extent the differences in loss-offset possibilities. Using a model-theory ap-
proach, Gérard and Weiner (2003) compare the impact of cross-border loss-offset and consolidation 
under a system of consolidation and formulary apportionment and under a system of SA for the invest-
ment behaviour of an MNG. They assume that under SA, no loss-offset or a cross-border loss-offset is 
applied. Thus, contrary to our approach, they do not include the possibility of a separate per country 
loss-offset, which is currently common in EU Member States. They show that cross-border loss-offsets 
mitigate the reactions to tax changes, whereas consolidation and formulary apportionment boosts the 
sensitivity thereto. 
Using a numerical analysis, Dahle and Bäumer (2009) compare the effects of selected loss-offset limi-
tations under SA with those under the CCCTB system and the European tax allocation system for 
MNGs’ cross-border investment. While we consider different profit/loss time frames and also include 
in our investigation currently applied EU loss-offset rules, they restrict their analysis to selected increas-
ing/constant cash-flow streams. They conclude that the replacement of SA by the CCCTB system would 
generally increase profitability due to cross-border loss-offsets.3 By contrast, in this article we find 
mixed results and clarify that the CCCTB system – even in loss scenarios – may not be beneficial. 
Oestreicher, Keser and Kimpel (2013) study loss-making corporate groups and their decision regarding 
whether to opt for the CCCTB system. In contrast to the present article, they shed light on the decision-
making process from a behavioural perspective. Their experiment with human subjects indicates that 
loss-exposed groups tend to opt for the CCCTB system. Their results are in line with the outcomes of 
                                                 
3  For more literature regarding asymmetric taxation in an international setting that does not specifically refer to 
the CCCTB, see Lyon and Silverstein (1995) and Niemann (2004a). 
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our basic general model. 
To our knowledge, there is, as yet, no analytical investigation that compares SA and CCCTB with regard 
to loss-offset rules and different profit/loss time frames. This is surprising, given that prior research 
indicates that both loss-offset rules and cash flow time structures are crucial for investment decisions. 
In this article, we aim to fill this void. As the lack of cross-border loss-offset under SA is “one of the 
most important obstacles to cross-border economic activity” (European Commission 2001, p. 39), loss-
offset rules under a CCCTB system may be a promising avenue to improve the environment for cross-
border investment. We identify conditions for such an improvement for MNGs. Our results allow inves-
tors to anticipate the tax effects in loss scenarios, and also allow tax reformers to improve their estima-
tion of the expected behaviour of MNGs on CCCTB enforcement. These results are particularly note-
worthy in the aftermath of economic crises, which are likely to generate huge amounts of loss carry-
forwards. Thus, our findings may contribute to national and European tax reform discussions. 
3 Legal Basis 
3.1 CCCTB 
Here, we assume that the CCCTB system will come into force as proposed in the draft of the Directive 
(see European Commission 2011). The main purpose of the CCCTB project is to enable the consolidated 
computation of taxable income for corporations operating within the EU (see Barenfeld 2007, p. 259). 
Thus, losses incurred by one taxpayer are automatically offset against profits of other group entities (see 
Temme, Sporken and Okten 2011, p. 323). The consolidation eliminates intragroup transactions, such 
as transfer pricing transactions and interest and dividend payments (article 59). The consolidated tax 
base is subsequently reallocated to the group members by using a formula-based sharing mechanism 
(see European Commission 2011, p. 8 (iii)). The formula takes into account three equally weighted 
factors, namely sales, labour and assets. The CCCTB system does not imply a harmonized tax rate. The 
Member States still have the right to tax their share of the tax base at their national corporate tax rate 
(article 103). MNGs are allowed to carry forward losses indefinitely and without limitation as to the 
amount (article 43), whereas a loss carry-back is not allowed at all. EU resident companies and non-EU 
resident companies with permanent establishments or subsidiaries in the EU may opt for the CCCTB 
system (see Piot, Sigurdardottir and Rasch 2011, p. 415). In cases where only EU companies are in-
volved, MNGs that wish to opt for the CCCTB must use a special form (listed in Annex 1) and are 
subject to the corporate taxation system of the respective countries (listed in Annex 2, article 2). The 
system is based on an “all-in, all-out” approach (article 55 c)), that is, companies which belong to the 
same group may not opt for the CCCTB system separately, but only jointly with other group members 
(see Temme, Sporken and Okten 2011, p. 324). Once a company has opted into the system for the first 
time, it must apply the CCCTB system for at least five consecutive tax years (article 105 (1)). 
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3.2 Germany and France 
In the course of France and Germany’s efforts to establish a mutual CCCTB, Germany and France 
matched their loss-offset provisions. Thus, the loss carry-forward and carry-back provisions are now 
almost identical in both countries. Losses that are not carried back “may only be carried forward to be 
set off against the first € 1 million of net income in a given year without restriction” (Perdelwitz 2014, 
p. 9) in both countries (see also Gaoua 2014, p. 11). The remaining loss carry-forward can only be offset 
against up to 60% in Germany and up to 50% in France of the net income exceeding € 1 million. There 
is no time limitation for loss carry-forwards in both countries. Corporate taxpayers are also allowed to 
carry losses back amounting up to € 1 million for one year in both countries (see Gaoua 2014, p. 11; 
Perdelwitz 2014, p. 9). The loss carry-back entitles a French taxpayer to a tax credit. “The tax credit 
may be used during the following [five] years, and will be refundable in the sixth year” (Gaoua 2014, p. 
11). In Germany, the loss carry-back is directly offset against the net income of the previous year and 
leads to an immediate tax refund. Furthermore, neither France nor Germany currently allows cross-
border loss-offsets. 
The effects resulting from dividend taxation are crucial for the following analysis, as well. The dividends 
that the German parent receives from the French subsidiary are tax-exempt, with a lump sum of 5% of 
the gross dividend considered as a non-deductible expense (see Perdelwitz 2014, p. 13). France levies 
withholding taxes neither on these dividends in line with the Parent-Subsidiary Directive nor on interest 
payments (see Gaoua 2014, p. 23). Moreover, interest payments are fully deductible from the tax base 
under both national tax codes (see Perdelwitz 2014, p. 7; Gaoua 2014, p. 8) insofar as thin capitalization 
rules do not apply .4 In addition to the classic corporate tax, companies in Germany and France are also 
subject to a local business tax and a surcharge. The different kinds of taxes are taken into account in our 
model by the applied tax rate.5 The two tax systems explained above are used in our extended model in 
Section 4.3 
4 Model 
In the following, we introduce a model taking into account the most noteworthy loss-related character-
istics of both tax systems. We assume that the parent company is based in Germany and its wholly-
owned subsidiary in France. Both companies are fully equity-financed and have invested in a national 
real investment project that generates cash flows and gives rise to depreciation. During the period under 
review, this project is taken as the companies’ only business activity. The French subsidiary distributes 
                                                 
4  For the considered numerical examples, the safe harbour rule applies for the deductibility of interest in France. 
5  Also Kiesewetter and Mugler (2006) take the local business tax into account via the applied tax rates. As the 
German local business tax is of key significance for the taxation of corporations, its treatment is also crucial 
under the CCCTB system. However, so far it has failed to resolve whether and, if so, how the German local 
business tax would be integrated into the CCCTB system (see Scheffler et al. 2013, p. 28.). We assume that the 
local business tax is applied under the CCCTB system as applied under the German tax code. Consequently, 
we apply the same statutory profit tax rate for Germany under both systems. 
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all profits, in the form of dividends, to its German parent at the end of each year.6 By assumption, the 
German company uses these funds either to invest in the capital market or to redeem a loan. It carries 
out the capital market investments in Germany, since the German after-tax interest rate is the higher one 
(see Niemann and Treisch 2006, p. 1020; Gérard and Princen 2012, p. 10).7 
To focus on the effects of the respective tax systems, we assume that the companies do not adjust their 
investment behaviour (e.g. reallocate their assets or workforce) in order to achieve a more tax-efficient 
situation through formulary apportionment under the CCCTB system.8 We take the behaviour of tax-
payers as given and focus instead on inherent differences in the two alternate tax regimes. Furthermore, 
we neglect compliance costs (see Bettendorf et al. 2010, p. 577; Devereux and Loretz 2008, p.3) and 
abstract from shareholder taxation. Given heterogeneous shareholders with different tax brackets, in-
vestment decisions in MNGs are typically made without reference to shareholder-level taxation (see 
Cooper and Knittel 2010, p. 52; Egger and Loretz 2010, p. 1025; Niemann and Treisch 2006, p. 1016; 
Oestreicher and Koch 2011, p. 70). By simplifying our analysis in this way, the impact of the different 
loss-offset mechanisms under the two tax systems can be highlighted. 
We focus on dividend distribution and loan grants9 as the only means of economic integration of the 
parent company and subsidiary. We abstract from further interaction of the companies to exclude pos-
sible tax planning via transfer pricing under SA (see Gérard and Princen 2012, p. 4). Annual depreciation 
of the underlying asset is assumed to be straight-line and identical under both systems.10Furthermore, 
we assume that neither France nor Germany levies a different corporate tax rate under the CCCTB 
system than under their domestic systems.11 By assumption, the group fulfils all eligibility requirements 
for the CCCTB system.12 We also assume a perfect capital market with a pre-tax debit interest rate for 
borrowing identical to the pre-tax credit interest rate (see Dahle 2011, p. 61). The pre-tax interest rates 
in France and Germany are assumed to be identical. We take the after-tax net cash flow as a criterion 
for identifying tax effects. 
We describe in the following exemplarily the calculation of the MNGs’ net cash flows in only one period 
and, on this basis, demonstrate the determination of cash flows and tax payments in all periods of the 
                                                 
6  A yearly dividend distribution is also assumed by Gérard and Princen (2012), p. 5. 
7  Taking into account the statutory profit tax rates in France (37.06%) and Germany (30.95%), the interest rate 
and the dividend taxation, Germany turns out to be the country of choice for financial investments. 
8  Also Devereux and Loretz (2008), p. 2; Oestreicher and Koch (2011), p. 92 abstract from behavioural changes 
of firms. 
9  French thin capitalization rules do not apply, as in our numeric example the interest payments are not greater 
than € 150,000 (see Gaoua 2014, p. 8). 
10  We interpret depreciations under both tax systems as a proxy for all other kinds of non-cash accruals. See, 
e.g., Niemann (2004b), p. 362, and Dahle and Bäumer (2009), p. 8. 
11  Also, Oestreicher and Koch (2011); Fuest et al. (2007) and Devereux and Loretz (2008) assume for their em-
pirical studies the same tax rate under the CCCTB systems. 
12  We refer here in particular to the two-part test that determines the membership of a company in a group by 
control and ownership (article 54). 
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time frame under review. 
4.1 Separate accounting 
The MNG maximizes the after-tax net cash flow. The net cash flow 𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑆𝐴 of the MNG in period 𝑡 
under the system of SA is determined by summing up the gross cash flows 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑅 , 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐹𝑅 and the interest 
income (pre-tax interest rate 𝑖𝑡  times the financial investment of the previous period 
𝐹𝐼𝑡−1
𝑆𝐴_𝐺𝐸𝑅 , 𝐹𝐼𝑡−1
𝑆𝐴_𝐹𝑅13) and subtracting the tax payments 𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝐴_𝐺𝐸𝑅 , 𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝐴_𝐹𝑅14 of both group companies: 
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑆𝐴 = 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑅 + 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐹𝑅 + 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑡−1
𝑆𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑅 + 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑡−1
𝑆𝐴𝐹𝑅 − 𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑅 − 𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐹𝑅. (1) 
If the French company incurs a positive net cash flow 𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐹𝑅  it distributes a dividend to the German 
company. Under the principle of prudence, the dividend distribution is limited to the net cash flow less 
depreciation (see Meller 2010, p. 148). Given that the distribution limitation applies, surplus liquidity 
amounting to the value of the depreciation is retained in the French company. The French company is 
assumed to reinvest this excess liquidity in the French capital market. Whenever the French company 
incurs losses, we assume that it takes out a loan from the German company. Although the French com-
pany is fully equity-financed, we assume that all of its means are bound in assets or projects and thus 
are not available to compensate for the loss. As a consequence this company has to take a loan from its 
parent company. The bound means are assumed to be sufficient to serve as collateral for loans taken 
from the parent company. Due to the positive pre-tax present value of earnings it is assured that the 
entities only temporarily incur losses in our setting. Thus, the subsidiary is at no point in time exposed 
to insolvency risk. The French company is assumed to redeem 50% of the principal amount 𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑅 in the 
following period.15 Furthermore, it pays interest at the market rate to the German parent. If the company 
redeems the principal amount of the loan, the dividend in eq. (2) is determined following deduction of 
this payment. If the German parent is short on funds, it borrows from the capital market to fill the gap. 
Finally, the fraction of the French net cash flow that exceeds the value of the depreciation and the re-
demption of the principal amount is distributed to the German parent company as a dividend 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡. The 
                                                 
13  If variables used for building the relevant models do not have the same values under both systems, the variables 
are additionally labelled with “SA” or “CCCTB”, respectively. 
14  The formulas are based on the approach of Schanz and Schanz (2011), pp. 275-293, and adjusted for CCCTB 
and separate accounting purposes in our setting. 
15 We assume that only 50% instead of 100% of the principal amount are redeemed in the second period. Other-
wise, in case of a 100%-redemption, in many constellations liquid funds would be exhausted such that dividend 
payouts would not be possible. As consequence we would end up in scenarios with mixed effects arising from 
the underlying tax systems on the one hand side and differences in dividend policy on the other hand side. Our 
approach is also in line with the observation that MNGs typically try to signal a constant dividend policy to 
shareholders. In order to avoid a shortage in liquidity that is likely to prevent dividend payouts we limit the per-
period redemption amount. However, even if 100% were redeemed in the second period, our results only change 
in a few border cases. The interest and dividend taxation effects prove to have a rather small impact on our 
results. We do not account for the future effects resulting from the redemption of the remaining principal amount 
explicitly since it would increase the complexity of the model tremendously and we find in exemplary numerical 
simulations that the present value of these effects is negligible small. 
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German parent company invests all of its surplus liquidity in the German capital market (see Bäumer 
2011, p. 72; Sureth and Bäumer 2010, pp. 176-179). 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡 =  𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐹𝑅 + 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑡−1
𝑆𝐴𝐹𝑅 − 𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐹𝑅 − 𝐷𝑡
𝐹𝑅 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑅; 0}.  (2) 
We obtain the tax payments 𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝐴 to be made by each company by multiplying the tax rate 𝜏𝑡   by the 
tax base 𝑇𝐵𝑡
𝑆𝐴. In both countries, the tax base 𝑇𝐵𝑡
𝑆𝐴 is determined by the adjusted gross income 𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝐴 , 
the loss-offset 𝐿𝑂𝑡
𝑆𝐴 and the loss carry-back 𝐿𝐶𝐵𝑡.
16 
𝑇𝐵𝑡
𝑆𝐴 = max{𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝐴 − 𝐿𝑂𝑡
𝑆𝐴; 0} −𝐿𝐶𝐵𝑡 . (3) 
Apart from the addition of 5% of the gross dividend under German law, the adjusted gross income 
𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝐴 is similarly determined in both countries: 
𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐹𝑅 = 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐹𝑅 − 𝐷𝑡
𝐹𝑅 + 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑡−1
𝑆𝐴𝐹𝑅 , (4) 
𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑅 = 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑅 − 𝐷𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑅 + 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑡−1
𝑆𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑅 + 0.05 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡. (5) 
Eq. (6) reflects the determination of the loss-offset for the German company. The equation for the French 
company is similar, except that 0.5 (instead of 0.6) of the € 1 million exceeding amount of the net income 
may be utilized to offset losses. 
𝐿𝑂𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑅 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑡−1
𝑆𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑅; 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑅; 0}; 1,000,000 + 0.6 [𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑅; 0} − 1,000,000]}. (6) 
The loss carry-forward 𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑡 at the end of period 𝑡, that can be utilized in period 𝑡 + 1, can be derived 
from the following equation for the German and the French company: 
𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑆𝐴 = 𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑡−1
𝑆𝐴 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛{0; 𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝐴} − 𝐿𝐶𝐵𝑡 − 𝐿𝑂𝑡
𝑆𝐴. (7) 
France and Germany allow for an annual loss carry-back 𝐿𝐶𝐵𝑡 up to € 1 million: 
𝐿𝐶𝐵𝑡 = min {1,000,000; max{TBt−1
𝑆𝐴 ; 0}; max{−AGIt
SA; 0}}, (8) 
The model defined in this subsection depicts the main legal characteristics of the national French and 
German tax law that we take into account for our analysis. 
4.2. CCCTB 
Similar to the system of SA, net cash flow under the CCCTB system is determined as follows: 
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵 = 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑅 + 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐹𝑅 + 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑡−1
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵𝐺𝐸𝑅 + 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑡−1
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵𝐹𝑅 − 𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵𝐺𝐸𝑅 − 𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵𝐹𝑅 . (9) 
The taxes to be paid under the CCCTB system result from the application of the German and French tax 
rate to the respective shares of the group tax base. The apportionment factor 𝛽 denotes the share of the 
group tax base that is allocated to the German company. Thus, (1 − 𝛽) of the tax base is allocated to 
                                                 
16  As eq. 3 is valid for both the French company and the German company, we decided not to label the variables 
with the country-specific abbreviations. 
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the French company. 
𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵 = 𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵𝐺𝐸𝑅 + 𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵𝐹𝑅 = (𝛽 ∗ 𝜏𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑅 + (1 − 𝛽) ∗ 𝜏𝑡
𝐹𝑅) ∗  𝑇𝐵𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵, (10) 
where 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1. 
The tax base under the CCCTB system 𝑇𝐵𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵 consists of the adjusted gross income 𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵, inso-
far as it is positive, minus a potential loss-offset 𝐿𝑂𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵 at the group level. If the sum of the adjusted 
gross incomes is negative, the tax base will take on a value of zero. 
𝑇𝐵𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵 = max{𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵; 0} − 𝐿𝑂𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵, (11) 
with the adjusted gross income 𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵: 
𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵 = 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑅 − 𝐷𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑅 + 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑡−1
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵𝐺𝐸𝑅 +  𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐹𝑅 − 𝐷𝑡
𝐹𝑅+𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑡−1
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵𝐹𝑅 . (12) 
The amount to be offset under the CCCTB system is restricted by the lesser of two terms: the adjusted 
gross income and the loss carry-forward accumulated in the previous periods. As a minimum taxation 
provision is not implemented, we obtain for the loss-offset 𝐿𝑂𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵: 
𝐿𝑂𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵 = min {𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑡−1
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵; 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵; 0}}. (13) 
The loss carry-forward 𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵 under the CCCTB system is determined in the same way as under the 
system of SA, except that no loss carry-back needs to be considered: 
𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵 = 𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑡−1
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛{0; 𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵} − 𝐿𝑂𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵. (14) 
Based on the models for the system of SA and the CCCTB system, we built up the financial plans for 
the numerical analysis. 
5 Numerical Analysis 
Providing a detailed picture of the loss-offset rules under either system in a closed-form, multi-period, 
theoretical model is difficult, as non-linear functions and condition-based provisions must be taken into 
consideration. Even in short-period perspectives, analytical models become inscrutable and scarcely 
allow any generalizable economic conclusions. As a result, we are forced to fall back on financial plans 
with numerical examples to capture specific conditions from the analysis.17 Financial plans allow us to 
deal with complex rules also in multi-period settings. In the numerical analysis, we calculate the after-
tax future value (see Sureth, Mehrmann and Dahle 2010, p. 168) of the underlying investment of the 
MNG by summing up the net cash flows of each period under consideration. 
5.1 Scope of the numerical analysis 
By considering a continuous period, the values of the previously introduced variables18 are functions of 
                                                 
17  This approach is in line with Majd and Myers (1987); Haegert and Kramm (1977); Niemann (2004b). 
18  These are the adjusted gross incomes, the tax bases, the loss carry-forwards, the loss carry-backs, the loss-
offsets, the dividend payments and the financial investments. 
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the cash flows 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑅, 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐹𝑅 and the depreciation 𝐷𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑅, 𝐷𝑡
𝐹𝑅 from the current or prior periods and the 
exogenous variables, i.e. 𝑖, 𝜏𝐹𝑅 ,  𝜏𝐺𝐸𝑅.19 Consequently, the decision to opt for the CCCTB system ulti-
mately depends only on the cash flow time pattern20 of the French and the German companies, the cor-
responding depreciation and the exogenous variables. The following analysis focuses on the impact of 
different combinations of time patterns and magnitudes of cash flows and depreciation on the relative 
advantageousness of either tax system. By assumption, the decision as to whether to opt for the CCCTB 
system must be made at the beginning of the first period. 
To demonstrate the tax effects, we consider pre-tax cash flows for both the German and the French 
company that vary in increments of € 200,000 between -€ 3 million and € 3 million in the first period. 
This range of values is sufficient to illustrate which cash flow pattern is advantageous for which tax 
system. To analyse the effect of different loss-offset rules, both the French company and the German 
company are required to have at least one tax year with losses. In order to ensure this and, furthermore, 
to ensure that the alternative time patterns and magnitudes of the pre-tax cash flows are still comparable, 
we assume that the pre-tax present value of the cash flows of each company is always € 100,000.21 Thus, 
a specific growth factor 𝜀 must be applied to the first period’s cash flows to determine the cash flows 
for the subsequent period. This factor is calculated as follows: 
ε =
100,000−𝐶𝐹1
𝐶𝐹1∗(1+𝑖)−1.
 (15) 
Using eq. (15) leads to a high positive cash flow in the first period and a high negative cash flow in the 
second period, and vice versa, for each company. This determination of the cash flows in both periods 
guarantees that a change in the ranking of the alternative tax systems is impacted only by the different 
taxation procedures. 
Nevertheless, the determination of positive and negative pre-tax cash flows is not sufficient to ensure 
that a tax loss or profit arises, as the tax base depends also on the interest payments/income, on depre-
ciation allowances and, in addition, on 5% of the gross dividend under the system of SA. However, the 
values of the crucial variables are chosen in the numerical analysis in such a way that both companies 
always face one profit period and one loss period under both systems. The depreciation 𝐷, amounting 
to € 30,000 for both companies 𝐷𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑅 = 𝐷𝑡
𝐹𝑅 = 𝐷, is chosen in such a way that the French and German 
                                                 
19  The apportionment factor β consists partly of a fixed component (allocation of assets and labour) and partly 
also on the cash flows as a proxy for the sales of the respective company. See Section 5.2.1. 
20  Earlier analyses have already shown that cash flow time patterns are important for potential loss-offsets. See 
Barlev and Levy (1975), p. 178; Haegert and Kramm (1977), p. 205; Niemann (2004a), p. 24; Niemann (2004b), 
p. 363; Dahle (2011), p. 62. 
21  Assuming equal after-tax present values of the cash flows of both companies under one tax system, and taking 
this case as a benchmark for the analysis of the respective other tax system, would not reveal the inherent 
differences between Germany and France in the former tax system and is thus inappropriate for our analysis. 
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investment projects are worthwhile after taxes.22 We use statutory profit tax rates for Germany and 
France of 30.95% and 37.06%, respectively, as computed by the Centre for European Economic Re-
search.23 
We assume that remaining loss carry-forwards at the end of the second period may be offset against 
profits of other future investment projects (see Oestreicher and Koch 2011, p. 80). Using a two periods-
model allows us to capture the decisive characteristics of both tax systems and simultaneously to single 
out the loss induced implications. The main differences in the utilization of losses between the two 
systems already arise in the first two periods since the group can make use of the loss carry-back under 
SA while not under CCCTB. Although in the following periods the group may use remaining loss carry-
forwards under SA, however, the overall tax benefit from loss-offset under the CCCTB system is greater. 
Thus, and in order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, it is adequate to estimate the future tax 
effects from loss carry-forwards. Empirical evidence suggests that the remaining loss carry-forwards of 
both companies can be valued at 𝜃𝑆𝐴 = 40% of their face value under the system of SA.24 As the possi-
bilities to offset losses tend to be better under the CCCTB system, we assume that 𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵 = 45% of the 
loss carry-forwards may be utilized.25 We test the robustness of our result with respect to these values 
in the sensitivity analysis.  
5.2 After-tax future values 
The following two figures illustrate how the MNG’s after-tax future values under the CCCTB system 
and under the system of SA, respectively, depend on the “earnings”. For the purpose of this paper, 
“earnings” denotes “cash flows 𝐶𝐹 less depreciation 𝐷” of the German and French company. Here, we 
refer to the after-tax future values as relative decision criteria since they allow us to compare the deci-
sions effects of the respective tax systems directly. The values for the German and French earnings are 
plotted in increments of € 200,000. However, we consider that two periods, the abscissa and the ordinate 
are scales with regard to “cash flows less depreciation in the first period”. As the cash flows of the 
second period are endogenously determined by the growth factor 𝜀, the corresponding earnings for the 
second period do not have to be plotted explicitly. The disparity in the future values is, under both tax 
systems, mainly driven by the utilization of losses. The more that losses may be utilized during the time 
                                                 
22  Whether an investment project is worthwhile depends in part on the size of the initial investment, which we do 
not consider here explicitly. However, it is assumed that the initial investment equals the sum of the depreciation 
for the object of the investment. We have chosen the depreciation in such a way that the sum thereof is in any 
case smaller than the after-tax income generated from the project. Consequently, the investment project is for 
every scenario worthwhile after taxation. 
23  The statutory profit tax rate of the French corporation and the German corporation for 2012 are provided by the 
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) (see Elschner et al. 2012). 
24  Empirical evidence indicates that approximately 40% of German losses may later be offset against profits. See 
Schneider (1988), p. 1222; see also Niemann and Treisch (2006), p. 1020; Haegert and Kramm (1977), p. 205. 
As the German and the French provisions for loss carry-forward are almost similar, we assume that this evalu-
ation holds for the French company as well. 
25  Due to the cross-border loss-offset and the non-existence of the minimum and dividend taxation, the possibili-
ties to offset losses might be better under the CCCTB system. 
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frame under consideration, the higher the after-tax future values. 
5.2.1 CCCTB system 
The group tax base under the CCCTB system is allocated to the French company and the German com-
pany according to the apportionment formula. We assume that the formula factors of assets and labour 
are equally allocated between both companies, so that 50% of these factors are attributed to each com-
pany in both periods.26 The accumulation of financial assets in Germany does not change the asset allo-
cation between both companies, as financial assets are disregarded for determining the asset factor. The 
sales factor for each company is assumed to vary in line with the respective pre-tax cash flows. We take 
the magnitude of the pre-tax cash flows as a proxy for the magnitude of the sales of every company.27 
If the pre-tax cash flow is negative for one company, we assume that this company does not engage in 
any sales, so that 100% of the sales are generated by the other company. In that extreme case, the group 
tax base is apportioned to the companies in the proportion of 33% to 67%.28 For varying French and 
German earnings we obtain the future earnings that are illustrated in Fig. 1. 
The highest future values (approximately € 180,000) emerge for that half of the combinations of French 
and German earnings that result in a negative or zero CCCTB in the first period (combinations of area 
1).29 For the other half of the combinations (combinations of area 2), that lead to a positive CCCTB in 
the first period, the future values decrease with increasing French and German earnings. When the Ger-
man and French earnings take the maximum considered value of approximately € 3 million, the lowest 
future value of -€ 996,208 occurs. 
                                                 
26  As both group companies incur the same present value of pre-tax cash flows, we presume that both companies 
invested the same amount of money in their respective projects. Assuming that the investment involves the 
same level of labour and assets in both countries, 50% of these factors are allocated to each company. As liquid 
funds are invested in the capital market and not in real investment projects of the companies, we further assume 
that no additional assets are purchased and no additional workforce is hired in the period under review. Vice 
versa, we assume that the companies do not sell part of their assets or reduce workforce in loss-making periods. 
Thus, the magnitude of assets and labour is assumed to remain constant. Also Eberhartinger and Petutschnig 
(2014) assume in their game-theoretic analysis that assets are distributed equally between their two considered 
countries. For a detailed examination of potential effects of real investments on apportionment factors see Die-
trich and Kiesewetter (2007), p. 507. 
27  The share of the sales factor, which is allocated to each company, is approximated by the relation of the pre-tax 
cash flows of the respective company to the pre-tax cash flows of the group. We assume that the German com-
pany sells to German clients, and the French company to French clients. The companies are assumed to not 
export to other countries. 
28  In an alternative approach, we assume that the apportionment factor β is fixed and constant over time and thus 
it is independent of the magnitude of the pre-tax cash flows. Untabulated results show that this variation has 
little impact on our results even if the apportionment factor β takes on extreme values of zero or one. 
29  This is the case if the absolute value of negative earnings of one company is greater than or equal to the positive 
earnings of the other company, or both group companies incur negative or zero earnings in the first period. 
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Fig. 1 Future values under the CCCTB system 
 
 
A negative or zero CCCTB in the first period (area 1) leads to the highest future values, as all losses can 
be utilized to decrease the tax burden in the second period. Thus, area 1 represents full loss-offset sce-
narios. The loss carry-forward of the first period may be utilized to offset a large share of the taxable 
profits of the second period. By contrast, a positive CCCTB in the first period (area 2) leads to lower 
future values, as the resulting losses of the second period may not be utilized during the time interval 
considered. Taxes must be paid on the profits of the first period, whereas the losses of the second period 
are evaluated at only 𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵 = 45% to offset future profits. By increasing first period’s earnings of a 
group company, the relative gap between taxes paid in the first period and the assigned present value of 
the future tax refunds for the loss carry-forwards of the second period increases, as well. Thus, by in-
creasing earnings in the first period, more taxes must be paid in relation to the pre-tax cash flows of € 
100,000, what results in lower future values for the group. 
5.2.2.  System of separate accounting 
In Fig. 2 we show the MNG’s future values under the system of SA. Due to the application of SA in 
determining the tax burden of the group companies, and due to increased complexity with regard to the 
treatment of losses, this graph is more complex than that in Fig. 1. All losses may be utilized for tax 
purposes if neither the loss carry-back restriction nor the minimum taxation applies for the companies. 
This is the case if the earnings of both group companies range between - € 1.2 million and € 1 million 
in the first period (area A in Fig. 2). Thus, area A represents scenarios with full loss utilization. In area 
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A, future values are not identical but only differ slightly. The highest future value under the system of 
SA amounts to € 178,493. 
If the earnings of the German and/or the French group company exceeds € 1 million in the first period, 
the loss carry-back restriction will apply in the second period. The minimum taxation applies in the 
second period, given that the earnings of the respective group companies fall below -€ 1.2 million in the 
first period. The future values decrease with increasing/decreasing earnings of the group companies in 
the first period if the earnings exceed the respective limits for the loss carry-back restriction and/or the 
minimum taxation. The more the earnings exceed these limits, the smaller the share of the overall losses 
that may be utilized during the given time frame and the smaller the resulting future values. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Future values under the system of separate accounting 
 
 
As long as only one of the two group companies may not entirely utilize its losses in the given time 
frame but the respective other company may do so, the future values of the group range between areas 
B (loss carry-back restriction applies to the German company), D (loss carry-back restriction applies to 
the French company), F (minimum taxation applies to the German company) or H (minimum taxation 
applies to the French company). If both of the group companies may not entirely utilize their losses, the 
future value lies in areas C (loss carry-back restriction applies to both companies), E (minimum taxation 
applies to the German company and the loss carry-back restriction applies to the French company), G 
(minimum taxation applies to both companies) or I (loss carry-back restriction applies to the German 
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company and minimum taxation applies to the French company). The lowest future value (-€ 721,177) 
of the group arises if the earnings of both group entities take the highest values considered in this anal-
ysis (i.e. approximately € 3 million), as then due to the loss carry-back restriction the largest share of 
losses remains unused. 
We find that the time pattern of the profits/losses streams and, arising from this, the divergent opportu-
nities to utilize the upcoming losses are the key drivers of the MNG’s future values under both tax 
systems in our setting. 
5.3 Favourable tax system depending on time structure and magnitude of earnings 
The following graph illustrates which of the two underlying tax systems is advantageous for which 
combinations of earnings of the French company and the German company, based on the future values 
shown in the previous two graphs (Fig. 1 and 2).  
As the graph in Fig. 3 shows, the CCCTB system is advantageous for most of the plotted earnings. The 
graph shows 961 combinations, and for 632 of them the CCCTB system is preferable. However, the 
system of SA is advantageous if the German and French earnings are positive in the first period or if 
they are slightly negative for one group entity and positive for the other. 
 
Fig. 3 Separate accounting versus CCCTB depending on earnings of both companies 
 
 
Depending on different time patterns of the entities’ earnings we identify four different tax effects that 
are crucial for the relative attractiveness of either system. The magnitude of each of these four effects 
determines whether the one or the other tax system is overall preferable: 
 loss utilization effect: This effect refers to the share of overall group losses that may be offset 
against profits under each tax system. The evaluation of the remaining loss carry-forwards at the 
end of the second period is also decisive for the advantageousness of each tax system; 
 dividend taxation effect: This effect is always to the disadvantage of the system of SA, as 5% of 
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the intragroup dividends constitute a non-deductible expense for the German company. To check 
whether our results hold for fully tax-exempt dividends30 on the parent level, we conducted a 
sensitivity analysis and found in tendency corresponding results. 31  
 interest taxation effect: Given that the French subsidiary must take a loan from the German parent, 
the interest payments in subsequent years are deductible in higher-taxed France and are taxed in 
the lower-taxed Germany under the system of SA. Intragroup loans are irrelevant for tax purposes 
under the CCCTB system. Thus, in this setting, the interest taxation effect always favours the 
system of SA;32  
 tax base allocation effect: The shares of the overall group tax base that are taxed in France/Ger-
many under the CCCTB system differ from the shares that are taxed under the system of SA.33 
Generally speaking, the tax base allocation between the two companies tends to be more moderate under 
the CCCTB system than under the system of SA, due to consolidation and due to the equally-allocated 
formula factors of assets and labour. As the French tax rate is higher than that in Germany (𝜏𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑅 < 𝜏𝑡
𝐹𝑅) 
, it is desirable from the group’s perspective that most profits be taxed in Germany and most losses in 
France. However, as every company generates profits in one period and incurs losses in the other, the 
tax system that proves to be advantageous with regard to the tax base allocation in one period becomes 
disadvantageous in the other period. Thus, the tax base effects counterbalance each other to some extent 
during the periods under review. However, due to the positive present value of the pre-tax cash flows 
and due to the partly extinguished losses at the end of the second period, the impact of the tax base 
allocation in the profit period is stronger than that of the loss period. 
For the following interpretation, we first consider the combinations of earnings that result in a negative 
or zero CCCTB in the first period (combinations of area a, area a also includes also the diagonal line of 
the graph). A full utilization of losses may be achieved for all combinations of area a under the CCCTB 
system,34 but for only a few combinations under the system of SA, due to the loss carry-back restriction 
and the minimum taxation. Even in cases in which losses may be offset entirely under both systems, the 
dividend taxation under the system of SA ensures that the CCCTB system is always preferable under 
such conditions. The interest taxation effect and – depending on the specific combinations in area A – 
the possibly preferable tax base allocation under the system of SA are not strong enough to lead to a 
change in the ranking of the tax systems. 
                                                 
30  Only in France, Germany, Italy and Belgium 5% of the gross dividend is subject to tax.  
31  Only in some exceptional cases our results change. 
32  The interest taxation effect occurs only if the French subsidiary incurs losses in the first period and thus takes 
a loan in the first period. Consequently, it pays interest in the second period. 
33  Only in rare situations the tax base allocation under the CCCTB system and the system of SA might be lead to 
similar outcomes (see Petutschnig 2012, p. 63). 
34 Compare with area 1 of Fig. 1. 
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In the following, we consider only the combinations above the line in Fig. 3. To compare the tax conse-
quences under the CCCTB system with those under the system of SA, we first focus on combinations 
of only positive earnings of both companies in the first period (area b). For these combinations, the 
system of SA is always advantageous, mainly because the resulting losses of the second period may at 
least partially be carried back under the system of SA. In contrast, under the CCCTB system, the second 
period’s loss may not be utilized at all during the time frame under review, but must be carried forward 
and is valued at 𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵 = 45%. The tax base allocation effect and the dividend taxation effect play 
rather minor roles and are crucial only in marginal cases. As the French company does not lack liquidity 
in the first period, the interest taxation effect does not appear. 
Next, we consider the tax consequences in the case where only one company incurs positive earnings 
and the other company incurs negative ones (area c1 and c2). Here, whether one or the other tax system 
is advantageous depends on the specific combination of earnings of both companies. In area c2 (c1) the 
German (French) company may carry back its losses of the second period and the French (German) 
company must carry forward the losses of the first period under the system of SA. Under the CCCTB 
system, the profits and losses of each group company may be offset cross-border in each period. In both 
areas, the CCCTB is positive in the first period (all losses of the German (French) company may be 
offset cross-border in area c1 (c2)) and negative in the second period (the losses of the French (German) 
company exceed the profits of the German (French) company in area c1 (c2)). The system of SA is 
beneficial if the advantage from carrying back the second period’s losses of the German (French) com-
pany (area c2 (c1)) is rather high. Specifically, the group benefits from SA if this advantage exceeds: 
 the benefit from a cross-border loss-offset under the CCCTB system; 
 the disadvantage of a loss carry-forward in the other company under SA in comparison to an 
immediate loss-offset under the CCCTB; 
 the disadvantage of the dividend taxation effect in period 1 (2) in area c1 (c2); and 
 in area c1, the disadvantage of the tax base allocation effect, which favours in this area the 
CCCTB system. 
The main driver of the results is the loss utilization effect. The interest taxation effect and the tax base 
allocation effect favour the system of SA in area c2, as well. Only for these combinations may the group 
deduct interest in higher-taxed France and tax them in Germany, and only for these combinations more 
tax base is taxed in lower-taxed Germany under the system of SA than under the CCCTB system. Due 
to these two additional effects in favour of the system of SA, there are more combinations for which the 
system of SA is advantageous in area c2 than in area c1. As becomes apparent from Fig. 3, with increas-
ing earnings of the company that may make use of the loss carry-back provision (the German (French) 
company in area c2 (c1)), the system of SA remains advantageous only for decreasing earnings of the 
other company. Under the system of SA, the relative share of utilizable losses decreases due to the loss 
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carry-back restriction with increasing earnings, and thus the system of SA declines in its relative advan-
tageousness. Thus, it can remain advantageous only if the profits and losses under the CCCTB system 
are very unbalanced and the advantage from the cross-border loss-offset is rather low. This is the case 
when the earnings of the other company decrease. 
The following graph clarifies to what extent one or the other tax system is superior. It shows, by exam-
ple, the future value of the group for fixed German earnings of -€ 30,000 in the first period and for 
varying earnings for the French group under both systems. 
 
Fig. 4 Future value of the MNG for a fixed value of German cash flows less depreciation of -€ 30,000 
 
The observable effects have been described previously. The graph shows that in the most extreme case 
(French earnings amount to -€ 3.03 million), the difference in future values between both systems 
amounts to approximately € 230,000. If the French earnings amount to -€ 30,000, the difference between 
both systems is the smallest. The future value under the system of SA is approximately € 900 higher 
than that under the CCCTB system. The graph clarifies that the differences in future values between 
both systems vary considerably, from marginal to substantial differences. 
The unlimited loss carry-forward provision without minimum taxation and the possibility of a cross-
border loss-offset make the CCCTB system advantageous for most of the combinations considered. 
However, the system of SA becomes advantageous if the profit/loss streams allow the utilization of the 
loss carry-back provision. The dividend and interest taxation effect and the tax base allocation effect are 
not the main drivers of our results, but in borderline cases they can be decisive. In the next section we 
investigate the impact of the assumptions made for our model on our findings through a sensitivity 
analysis. 
5.4 Generalization of the model 
As the national loss-offset provisions in France and Germany are very specific, we broaden our analysis 
to draw more generalizable conclusions. To capture the share of losses that can be offset under national 
laws we introduce loss-offset coefficients. The resulting model can be regarded as representative for the 
provision designs observable across Europe. We still distinguish between loss carry-back and loss carry-
forward provisions.  
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There are only five countries in the EU that allow for a loss carry-back. All of them are of high im-
portance either from an economic perspective, i.e., magnitude of economic activities (France, Germany, 
UK) or from a tax planning perspective of MNGs within Europe (the Netherlands, Ireland). The UK, 
the Netherlands and Ireland allow carrying losses back for one year unrestricted in amount. However, 
all EU countries allow to carry losses forward. We distinguish three different categories of countries 
with different loss carry-forward provisions. First, there are countries that do not restrict loss carry-
forwards at all; second, countries that restrict loss carry-forwards in amount; and third, countries that 
restrict them in time. The following table (Tab. 1) gives an overview of the loss-offset provisions across 
Europe (see IBFD 2015).35 
Loss carry-back  
(one year) 
France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, UK  
Unrestricted loss carry-
forward 
Belgium, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Sweden, UK   
Loss carry-forward  
restricted in amount 
(share of current year’s 
profits against which 
losses can be offset) 
Austria 75% 
Denmark 70% 
Hungary 50% 
Italy 50% 
Lithuania 80% 
Poland* 60% 
Portugal* 50% and 5 years 
Slovenia 70% and 12 years 
Loss carry-forward  
restricted in time 
(years) 
Bulgaria 5 
Croatia 7 
Cyprus 5 
Czech Republic 5 
Finland 10 
Greece 5 
Romania  5 
Slovak Republic 9 
Spain 4 
The Netherlands 18 
 
Tab. 1 Loss-offset provisions in EU Member States 
In the following, we use the set of equations as introduced in Section 4.1 and extend it with respect to 
differently determined loss-offsets 𝐿𝑂𝑡
𝑆𝐴 and loss carry-backs 𝐿𝐶𝐵𝑡. The factor  indicates the share of 
the adjusted gross income 𝐴𝐺𝐼 of each company against which loss carry-forwards from previous peri-
ods can be offset. The factor  captures the share of the tax base of the previous period 𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 against 
which current losses can be offset. We then obtain 
𝐿𝑂𝑡
𝑆𝐴 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑡−1
𝑆𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑅; 𝑚𝑎𝑥{ ∗ 𝐴𝐺𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝐴; 0}}, (16) 
                                                 
35  Countries that limit the loss-offset per period (minimum taxation) but allow taxpayers to offset unused losses 
in future periods are not categorized as “restricted in amount” in Tab. 1. 
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𝐿𝐶𝐵𝑡 = min {max{ ∗ TBt−1
𝑆𝐴 ; 0}; max{−AGIt
SA; 0}}. (17) 
A subset of EU countries allows to infinitely carry forward losses but has not implemented a loss carry-
back provision in the national tax code. For such countries  is equal to one and  is equal to zero. In 
such cases the loss-offset provisions under separate accounting and CCCTB are identical, except for the 
cross-border loss-offset under CCCTB. We find that under such parameter settings for both countries 
the CCCTB system is always preferable for the MNG. The dividend and interest taxation effect and – 
depending on the combinations of earnings – the cross-border loss-offset or the higher valuation of 
remaining losses under the CCCTB system, respectively, are crucial for this result. 
Under this set of parameters ( = 1, = 0), we find more interesting results if we disregard the 5%-
dividend taxation under the system of SA. Non-dividend taxation is representative for most EU countries 
as the 5%-dividend taxation exists only in four EU countries, i.e., Belgium, Italy, Germany and France. 
As shown in Fig. 5, the system of SA is preferable under such parameter settings for about one eighth 
of the illustrated combinations of French and German earnings. The advantageousness of the system of 
SA is solely caused by the tax base allocation effect, i.e., more losses are allocated to higher-taxed 
France under the system of SA than under the CCCTB system. Note that also for countries that restrict 
the loss carry-forward in time a picture similar to the one displayed in Fig. 5 emerges. Here, the pre-tax 
present value of earnings of € 100,000 of each company ensures that all of the first periods’ losses can 
be utilized in the second period and that the timely loss-offset restrictions do not apply. Thus, the na-
tional tax codes of the vast majority of the EU countries provide conditions that lead to the system of 
SA being preferable for some combinations of French and German earnings only because of tax base 
effects. By contrast, assuming that the 5%-dividend taxation applies, the system of SA is preferable only 
for countries that allow for a loss carry-back. 
 
Fig. 5 Separate accounting versus CCCTB, no dividend taxation, no loss carry-back  = 0, full loss carry-forward  = 1 
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We employ the example of domestic loss-offset possibilities in selected European countries to show 
how the relation between the loss carry-forward and carry-back provisions determines the relative ad-
vantageousness of the system of SA. First, taking the UK and Ireland as examples for non-dividend 
taxation, we investigate how an unlimited loss carry-forward and a one-year loss carry-back affect the 
relative advantageousness of the system of SA. Fig. 6 illustrates the results. 100% of all of the second 
periods’ losses of each entity can be carried back and all of the first periods’ losses can be utilized in the 
following period. Thus, the system of SA gains in relative advantageousness in comparison to the 
Franco-German case. As Fig. 6 shows in comparison to Fig. 4, there are significantly more cases in 
which the system of SA becomes preferable if the cash flow streams are opposing in their time pattern 
(see the enlargement of the blue triangular area to the upper left and the lower right corner in Fig. 6 in 
comparison to Fig. 4). 
 
Fig. 6 CCCTB vs SA, unrestricted loss carry-forward  = 1and loss carry-back  = 1 
 
In a next step, we vary the parameters for the loss carry-forward and for the loss carry-back. First, we 
run the analysis assuming that a minimum taxation at a rate of 50% ( = 0.5) and a full loss carry-back 
( = 1) applies, see Fig. 7, left graph. This case might appear in the Netherlands if loss carry-forwards 
cannot be entirely utilized as the time restriction applies. As a consequence, the present value of the 
resulting future tax refunds decreases, which is captured here by the coefficient  set equal to 50%. 
Second, we assume that only 50% of losses can be carried back ( = 0.5) but all of the losses can be 
carried forward without restrictions ( = 1), see Fig. 7, right graph. Within EU countries such a case 
cannot appear, since there is no country that restricts the loss carry-back in amount. However, we run 
this analysis because it gives insights in the relative importance of the loss carry-back in relation to the 
loss carry-forward provision and thereby opens our analysis to scenarios beyond the currently observa-
ble institutional settings in the EU. 
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Notes: left graph: unrestricted loss carry-forward  = 1, restricted loss carry-back  = 0.5; right graph: minimum taxation 
applies  = 0.5, full loss carry-back  = 1 
Fig. 7 CCCTB vs SA 
 
Fig. 7 shows that the 50%-restriction of the loss carry-back or the loss carry-forward lead to approxi-
mately the same amount of cases in which the system of SA is advantageous. Both restrictions make the 
system of SA relatively less attractive for MNGs. The effects of both restrictions on the advantageous-
ness of the system of SA are strictly linear. The higher the restriction, the smaller the future values under 
the system of SA. 
5.5 Sensitivity analysis  
In this subsection we examine the robustness of the previous results. To this end, different parameter 
variations are applied. If not stated differently the parameter settings are as in the Franco-German base 
scenario. In three steps, we analyse, ceteris paribus, the influence on the results of the evaluation of the 
remaining losses at the end of the second period, we allow for behavioural adjustments under the 
CCCTB system in order to take advantage of tax rate differentials and finally we have broadened the 
scope of the earnings for both group companies while retaining the parameter settings of the base sce-
nario. 
First, we analyse the impact of the evaluation of the remaining loss carry-forwards at the end of the 
second period. First, we vary the portion of losses that may be utilized in the future while retaining a 
constant relation between the utilizable losses under both tax systems. By varying the portion of the 
utilizable losses equally under both systems, it is obvious that higher loss utilization favours CCCTB. 
In the extreme case where 100% of the losses may be utilized in the next period under the CCCTB 
system and approximately 90% under the system of SA, there remain 25 out of 961 combinations under 
which the system of SA is preferable for the MNG (compared to 320 combinations in the base scenario, 
see Fig. 3).36 SA remains advantageous if the earnings of both companies are slightly below or exactly 
                                                 
36  In the base scenario the relation factor between the evaluations of the remaining losses under both tax systems 
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€ 1 million in the first period, as then the advantage from loss carry-backs is maximal. 
Next, we extend our approach and account for behavioural reactions. We assume that the MNG can 
adjust the allocation of assets and labour between Germany and France in order to benefit from tax rate 
differentials under the CCCTB system. The allocation of sales between the two countries is – like in the 
base scenario – still determined by the cash flows in each country and assumed to be subject to behav-
ioural adjustments. We refer to US data based studies that provide empirical evidence on MNG’s reac-
tions in factor allocation in face of effective tax rates. As it is a specific feature in the US formula 
apportionment system that the states may chose the weights on the apportionment factors individually 
several studies investigate how multijurisdictional groups react to a change in apportionment factor 
weights. Weiner (1994) and Lightner (1999) did not find any significant evidence that a change in the 
design of the apportionment formula goes in line with a change in factor allocation of US groups. Based 
on a richer panel data set, Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) find evidence that a reduction in the labour 
factor weight from one-third to one-fourth increases employment in the manufacturing sector signifi-
cantly by 1,1%. For our purposes, we can re-interpret the adjustments in factor allocation in face of a 
change in factor weights as a behavioural response on changes in effective tax rates. Thus, this empirical 
evidence from the US indicates that at least the short-term responses to tax rate differentials seem to be 
very small. If we assume that the Franco-German MNG is able to shift part of its labour and assets 
during a profit-period to lower-taxed Germany and during a loss-period to higher-taxed France the 
CCCTB system is more likely to be beneficial. However, if rather small shares of assets and labour are 
shifted – as indicated by the empirical literature – we will still find only very few border cases in which 
the preferable tax system changes towards the CCCTB system. 
Since it is questionable as to what extent results from the US can be transferred to a European setting, 
we re-run the analysis using empirical evidence gained from the profit shifting literature on OECD 
countries for behavioural factor allocation adjustment. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) investigate the 
income shifting behaviour in response to differing tax rates across OECD countries. Their results suggest 
that at the margin more than 65% of the additional revenue from a unilateral tax increase is lost because 
of income shifting. They interpret their result as a lower bound for the effects of tax rate changes on 
reported income. By contrast, the more recent income shifting literature identifies fundamentally smaller 
shifting effects in response to changes in tax differentials. The meta-analysis conducted by Heckemeyer 
and Overesch (2013) provides an overview. They scrutinize several empirical studies on profit shifting 
and find that overall the reported profits decrease by about 0.8% with an increase in the tax differential 
between countries by one percentage point. For technical reasons the study of Bartelsman and Beetsma 
(2003) has been excluded from their meta-analysis.  
                                                 
is 𝛿 =
𝛼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵
𝛼𝑆𝐴
=
45%
40%
= 1.13. For this sensitivity analysis, we increased 𝛼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵and 𝛼𝑆𝐴 but 𝛿 is kept constant. 
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Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) do not only account for real activity shifting but also for pure account-
ing income shifting. While it is clear that MNGs have incentives to shift assets and labour under the 
CCCTB system, Nielsen et al. 2003 find that they also have incentives to shift income. Thus, as MNGs 
under the CCCTB system are incentivised to shift real activity as well as accounting income, we use the 
findings of Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) in the following to figure out whether our results remain 
robust even in case of such extreme responses. We consider the empirical evidence found in their paper 
as an upper bound for possible behavioural adaptions under the CCCTB system. Hence, we assume in 
our sensitivity analysis that 65% of real activity in form of labour and assets can be shifted immediately 
to take advantage of tax rate differentials. This setting implies that in case of a positive CCCTB the 
MNG is assumed to shift 65% of assets and labour of the French entity to lower taxed Germany and in 
case of a negative CCCTB 65% of assets and labour of the German entity to France. However, even if 
we allow for such rather exaggerated responses under the CCCTB system our results do not change 
fundamentally. Only in one eighth of the combinations the preferable tax system changes from CCCTB 
to the system of SA. Consequently, the blue area in Fig. 3 in which the system of SA is advantageous 
shrinks slightly. We conclude from this investigation that the abstraction from behavioural responses 
under the CCCTB system does not question our basic results. 
Last but not least, we broaden the scope for the earnings to be considered. Instead of considering earn-
ings from approximately minus € 3 million to plus € 3 million, as in the base scenario, we now consider 
earnings from approximately minus € 45 million to plus € 45 million.37 The values for the German and 
French earnings are now plotted in increments of € 500,000. The parameter settings remain the same as 
those in the base scenario. The following graph shows only the results for positive earnings of both 
group companies (comparable to area b of Fig. 3). For the remaining combinations, the results do not 
add anything new to the findings of the base scenario. 
 
Fig. 8 Separate accounting vs. CCCTB depending on a broader scope of earnings 
 
                                                 
37  By considering a broader scope, the interest payments can be higher than € 150,000. See footnote 40. However, 
even in cases with high losses the thin capitalization rule does not apply for the French company because we 
assume that the indebtness condition (safe haven) is not violated. See Gaoua (2014), p. 26. 
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Fig. 8 shows that the system of SA is advantageous only up to a limited amount of positive earnings of 
the French and German company in the first period. The main reason for this is that there is a break-
even-point where the advantage of the utilization of a larger share of losses under the system of SA due 
to the loss carry-back, is overcompensated by the effects of a higher value of the remaining losses at the 
end of the second period under the CCCTB system (𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐵 = 0.45, 𝜃𝑆𝐴 = 0.4). 
The area in Fig. 8 for which the system of SA is advantageous is triangular shaped. The triangle can be 
described by its apexes and the point of origin. Specific combinations of German and French earnings 
determine the edge and apexes of the triangle, and thus the break-even point of SA and CCCTB’s rela-
tive attractiveness. Under the given set of assumptions: 
 the German earnings are limited to € 1 million and the earnings are limited to € 10.5 million  
(top apex); or 
 
 the French earnings amount to € 1 million and the German earnings amount to € 40 million  
(right apex) 
in the first period to favour SA. The upper and right apex of the triangle result mainly from the loss 
carry-back provision under the system of SA: The relative advantage of the system of SA over the 
CCCTB system is highest if the earnings of German or French company takes on a value of € 1 million, 
as the benefit from the loss carry-back provision is maximal then. Due to the high relative advantageous-
ness of the system of SA over the CCCTB system for earnings of € 1 million for one company in the 
first period, the system of SA remains advantageous even if the earnings of the other company are very 
high in the first period. Very high earnings in the first period imply that the share of utilizable losses is, 
due to the application of the loss carry-back restriction, rather low in the second period. 
The CCCTB system turns out to be advantageous for lower French earnings (top apex) than for German 
earnings (right apex). There are two reasons for this imbalance. First, dividend taxation under the system 
of SA for increasing French earnings favours the CCCTB system. Second, the tax base allocation for 
increasing French earnings favours the CCCTB system, as well, because – compared to the system of 
SA – a lower share of the group tax base is taxed in higher-taxed France in the profit period.38,39 
Our sensitivity analysis shows that the results are dependent on the evaluation of the remaining losses 
at the end of the second period. Improved utilization of the remaining losses under both tax systems 
have a clear effect in favour of the CCCTB system. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that allowing for 
behavioural adjustments under the CCCTB system changes the overall results only slightly in favour of 
                                                 
38  The effects of the tax base allocation in the profit period exceed that of the loss period. See Section 5.3. 
39  By considering a broader scope of earnings, the tax base allocation effect becomes more important, as under 
separate accounting the allocation for the group tax base between the two companies can become more extreme. 
In some settings, low profits of one company meet very high profits of the other company. Thus, the first com-
pany maintains a very small share of the group tax base, while the latter company retains a very large one. In 
contrast, under the CCCTB system, the allocation of the tax base is smoother. 
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the CCCTB system. Both of previous variations do not challenge the basic findings of our analysis. By 
broadening the magnitude for earnings of both group companies, we show that the advantageousness of 
the system of SA for positive French earnings is limited to rather low values. 
4 Conclusion 
We have analysed the conditions under which the CCCTB system or the system of SA will be advanta-
geous for an MNG of which the member companies incur temporary losses. The focus on losses is 
particularly relevant and noteworthy, as the recent crisis led to enormous loss carry-forwards in MNGs 
and, furthermore, innovative activities like start-ups and R&D investment, which are crucial for MNG 
future performance, usually are characterized by initial losses. Against this background, it is vital to 
investigate the implications of the tax environment for temporarily loss-making MNGs. 
While prior research focuses mainly on the differences in economic behaviour under both systems in 
general, we study the conditions under which one or the other tax system is preferable from the perspec-
tive of an MNG, with a particular focus on loss-offsets. We simulate possible decision scenarios of 
MNG to ascertain under which conditions MNGs are likely to opt for the CCCTB system. We focus on 
European MNGs with losses at the parent and subsidiary levels. We build a tailor-made, numerical 
model for a representative MNG. To demonstrate typical differences between the respective national 
loss-offset provisions and that of the CCCTB system, we consider a group the parent of which is domi-
ciled in Germany, with a subsidiary in France. France and Germany allow losses to be carried back. By 
considering different magnitudes and time sequences of profit/loss streams of each group company, we 
vary the degree to which the MNG may utilize its losses by carrying them back and/or forward. We aim 
to focus only on differences inherent in the tax systems. Thus, we disregard behavioural adaptations in 
order to reduce tax payments under the respective systems. 
We find mixed results. We identify four effects that determine the decision of an MNG: the tax-utiliza-
tion of losses, the allocation of the tax base to the respective group companies, dividend taxation and 
intragroup interest taxation. We find that the CCCTB system proves advantageous for increasing 
loss/profit streams (e.g. from start-ups or R&D projects) of the single group entities, whereas the system 
of SA is beneficial for decreasing profit/loss streams (e.g. caused by a decrease in return from a mature 
product). The loss-offset under the CCCTB system has two major advantages compared to the system 
of SA: no minimum taxation is applicable and cross-border loss-offsets are possible. The inherent ad-
vantage of the French and German national tax regimes under the system of SA, is the possibility to 
carry back losses. We conclude that the possibility of carrying losses back is decisive for the advanta-
geousness of the system of SA in the Franco-German context. 
If the MNG’s entities carry out projects that result in opposing profit/loss streams, the CCCTB system 
will, in most cases, be advantageous, as losses may be offset cross-border. However, counter-intuitively, 
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the CCCTB system is not unconditionally preferable in cases where a cross-border loss-offset is appli-
cable. Rather, it is the magnitude of these entities’ profits and losses that determines whether the CCCTB 
system is worthwhile. If the CCCTB is initially positive but becomes negative over time and, further-
more, if the relationship between the losses and profits of the respective group entities is rather unbal-
anced, the decision not to opt for the CCCTB system tends to be attractive. The reason is that losses may 
be utilized earlier under the system of SA, thanks to the loss carry-back provision. However, if the 
CCCTB is initially negative and becomes positive over time, the results of the analysis point towards 
choosing the CCCTB system, as in these constellations at least some of the losses may be utilized im-
mediately, thanks to the cross-border loss-offset, while any remaining losses may be carried forward 
without limitation. 
Furthermore, our findings suggest that the CCCTB system tends always to be advantageous if only one 
of the group companies incurs high initial losses that are followed by high profits. Such extreme 
profit/loss streams are typical for projects that involve high initial R&D expense, for example in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The advantageousness of the CCCTB system in such cases is explained by the 
application of the minimum taxation under the system of SA, which strongly restricts the loss-offset for 
the extreme profit/loss streams considered here. 
We broaden the Franco-German example towards a general European perspective and elaborate the 
effects resulting from differently designed loss-offset provisions and from different tax treatment of 
dividends. Addressing a variety of loss-offset provisions that exist across Europe allows us assessing 
more adequately how the design of loss-offset provisions impacts the advantageousness of each tax 
system. Taking exemplarily the UK and Ireland, we find that an unlimited loss carry-forward and a one-
year loss carry-back favours the system of SA clearly. In such case the number of combinations for 
which the system of SA is advantageous increases by about 50%. Furthermore, the generalized model 
clarifies that in case of no dividend taxation and in case of an unlimited loss carry-forward and no loss 
carry-back (like, e.g., in Sweden or Luxembourg) the tax base effects alone ensure that the system of 
SA is advantageous for one eighth of combinations. 
Our findings must be interpreted against the background of our set of assumptions. The results are 
strongly driven by the evaluation of remaining losses at the end of the second period. A better utilization 
of losses may fundamentally benefit the CCCTB system. However, the results of the sensitivity analysis 
clarify that even if we vary the loss-offset possibilities strongly in favour of the CCCTB system, there 
still remain combinations for which the system of SA is advantageous. Thus, our basic conclusions are 
not challenged by the assumptions about the loss carry-forwards at the end of the second period. Fur-
thermore, broadening the range of earnings reveals that the system of SA can be advantageous only for 
combinations that include relatively low profits of both companies in the first period. Consequently, the 
sensitivity analysis reveals that our outcomes are not limited to just specific numerical examples, but 
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can – to some extent – be generalized. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis points out that our results 
change only marginally if we allow for behavioural adjustments under the CCCTB system in order to 
take advantage of tax rate differentials. Our results are helpful in revealing the conditions under which 
it is advisable to opt for the CCCTB system. Moreover, they may also contribute to the discussion of 
corporate group tax harmonization within other economic zones, such as the United States. 
Our analysis contributes three important findings to the existing literature. First, in addition to the tax 
base allocation effect,40 it identifies further determinants that potentially have a decisive influence on 
the choice of the preferable tax systems, namely the dividend and interest taxation effect and the loss 
utilization effect. Second, as some prior studies deny the economic significance of the loss carry-back 
provision (see Haegert and Kramm 1977; Dwenger 2008; Dreßler and Overesch 2013), our study 
demonstrates that this provision does have a significant impact at least with regard to the choice of the 
preferable tax system. Third, our study makes clear that the intercompany loss-offset across borders 
under the CCCTB system is not necessarily preferable over the intertemporal loss-offset under the sys-
tem of SA. 
Whether the CCCTB proposal will be adopted is, in fact, far from certain. In moving toward its adoption 
by the EU, there has been a public debate on various adjustments to its provisions. Two of the many 
aspects under discussion are whether a common tax base without consolidation (CCTB) could prove 
acceptable and whether to implement the minimum taxation based on the German model. Our results 
indicate that each of these amendments would have a fundamental impact on the relative advantageous-
ness of the CCCTB system and would substantially decrease its attractiveness for MNGs. If both of the 
restrictions under discussion were applied, scarcely any incentive would remain for Franco-German 
MNGs to opt for the CCCTB system. 
There are still several important issues that have not yet been sufficiently addressed. For instance, our 
results indicate the difficulty of determining the optimal timing for a company’s decision to opt for the 
CCCTB system. This merits more careful examination in future research so that the overall tax effects 
in a dynamic setting that may arise as a consequence of the transition to the new system, can be antici-
pated. 
                                                 
40  Prior analytical studies focus mainly on the tax base allocation influenced by income shifting (see Nielsen et al. 
2010; Gérard and Princen 2012; Martini et al. 2012). 
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